TY - JOUR
T1 - Can Blockchain be Trusted in Industry 4.0?
T2 - Study of a Novel Misleading Attack on Bitcoin
AU - Ebrahimpour, Ghader
AU - Sayad Haghighi, Mohammad
AU - Alazab, Mamoun
PY - 2022/11/1
Y1 - 2022/11/1
N2 - After Bitcoin's emergence, blockchain found its way to many industries, including Fintech, Energy, and Manufacturing. Blockchains consensus algorithms, including Nakamoto's, are mechanisms to probabilistically guarantee that a transaction is not undone after confirmation. This requires that no one's computational power exceeds 50% of the network power. However, recent attacks on blockchains have raised serious questions about their security and whether they can be trusted to be employed in critical infrastructure and Industry 4.0. In this paper, we introduce a new category of blockchain attacks which we call "Misleading-Attacks''. In this type of attack, a fraction of network power is mislead so that the attacker reaches her goal. The technique is most effective when miners are rational and algorithm-oriented, similar to machines/agents in future Industry 4.0 or Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Moreover, this technique has the potential to be used in inventing new attacks, or can be used in combination with other known attacks. We first analyze a case in which the attacker uses misleading techniques to prevent her newly mined block from becoming orphan. We show that the proposed technique can push the attack success probability up by 16.42%. In a case study, we demonstrate how the technique promotes the success rate from 39% to 55.42%. Initiating the attack will be profitable if the attacker's power is more than 24% of the network power. By combining this novel technique with Bribery Attack, we show how the cost of Guaranteed Variable-Rate Bribing with Commitment (GVC) strategy can be drastically reduced.
AB - After Bitcoin's emergence, blockchain found its way to many industries, including Fintech, Energy, and Manufacturing. Blockchains consensus algorithms, including Nakamoto's, are mechanisms to probabilistically guarantee that a transaction is not undone after confirmation. This requires that no one's computational power exceeds 50% of the network power. However, recent attacks on blockchains have raised serious questions about their security and whether they can be trusted to be employed in critical infrastructure and Industry 4.0. In this paper, we introduce a new category of blockchain attacks which we call "Misleading-Attacks''. In this type of attack, a fraction of network power is mislead so that the attacker reaches her goal. The technique is most effective when miners are rational and algorithm-oriented, similar to machines/agents in future Industry 4.0 or Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Moreover, this technique has the potential to be used in inventing new attacks, or can be used in combination with other known attacks. We first analyze a case in which the attacker uses misleading techniques to prevent her newly mined block from becoming orphan. We show that the proposed technique can push the attack success probability up by 16.42%. In a case study, we demonstrate how the technique promotes the success rate from 39% to 55.42%. Initiating the attack will be profitable if the attacker's power is more than 24% of the network power. By combining this novel technique with Bribery Attack, we show how the cost of Guaranteed Variable-Rate Bribing with Commitment (GVC) strategy can be drastically reduced.
KW - Bitcoin
KW - Blockchain
KW - Blockchains
KW - Bribery Attack
KW - Costs
KW - Critical Infrastructure
KW - Fourth Industrial Revolution
KW - Industrial Internet of Things
KW - Industry 4.0
KW - Informatics
KW - Markov Chain
KW - Misleading-Attack
KW - Whales
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85123350988&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TII.2022.3142036
DO - 10.1109/TII.2022.3142036
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85123350988
SN - 1551-3203
VL - 18
SP - 8307
EP - 8315
JO - IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
JF - IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
IS - 11
ER -