Formal and informal sector credit institutions and interlinkage

Debajyoti Chakrabarty, Ananish Chaudhuri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Nationalized banks in poor countries often ration rural credit. This creates demand for loans from monopolistic landlord/moneylenders who often interlink credit and product contracts allowing the latter to extract more of the tenant's consumer surplus. In the presence of asymmetric information such arrangements can be inefficient. We find that increasing the fixed credit allocation to the rural sector at a subsidized rate does not reduce that inefficiency. The entire benefit of the subsidy is extracted by the moneylender. An alternative policy of providing credit at subsidized rates but in a flexible manner is more effective in reducing the inefficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)313-325
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2001
Externally publishedYes


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