Abstract
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is an appealing sensing paradigm that leverages the sensing capabilities of smart devices and the inherent mobility of device owners to accomplish sensing tasks with the aim of constructing powerful industrial systems. Incentivizing mobile users (MUs) to participate in sensing activities and contribute high-quality data is of paramount importance to the success of MCS services. In this article, we formulate the competitive interactions between a sensing platform (SP) and MUs as a multistage Stackelberg game with the SP as the leader player and the MUs as the followers. Given the unit prices announced by MUs, the SP calculates the quantity of sensing time to purchase from each MU by solving a convex optimization problem. Then, each follower observes the trading records and iteratively adjusts their pricing strategy in a trial-and-error manner based on a multiagent deep reinforcement learning algorithm. Simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed method.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Article number | 9201550 |
Pages (from-to) | 6182-6191 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics |
Volume | 17 |
Issue number | 9 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Manuscript received April 29, 2020; revised July 4, 2020, August 15, 2020, and August 28, 2020; accepted September 5, 2020. Date of publication September 21, 2020; date of current version June 16, 2021. This work was supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant 2019YFB1704702. Paper no. TII-20-2140. (Corresponding author: Bo Gu.) Bo Gu, Xinxin Yang, Ziqi Lin, and Weiwei Hu are with the School of Intelligent Systems Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China (e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Huww1998@ 163.com).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2005-2012 IEEE.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.