Network regulation and regulatory institutional reform

Revisiting the case of Australia

Rabindra Nepal, Flavio Menezes, Tooraj Jamasb

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Abstract

It is well-understood that the success of liberalizing the electricity supply industry depends crucially on the quality and design of the regulatory and institutional framework. This paper analyses the regulatory arrangements that underpin the work of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). These arrangements are contrasted with the regulatory structure of electricity provision in Norway. A key difference between the reform processes in the two countries relates to the lack of privatization in Norway and the co-existence of private and publicly owned generators and distributors in Australia. This comparative analysis allows us to make several recommendations to improve regulatory arrangements in Australia. These include greater independence for the AER, better coordination among regulatory institutions, greater use of benchmarking analysis, greater customer involvement, and improving market transparency and privatization of government-owned corporations. However, the success of privatization will hinge upon the effectiveness of the regulatory environment.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)259-268
Number of pages10
JournalEnergy Policy
Volume73
Issue numberOctober 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2014
Externally publishedYes

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institutional reform
Privatization
privatization
reform process
institutional framework
regulatory framework
benchmarking
Electric utilities
Benchmarking
Hinges
transparency
Transparency
coexistence
energy
electricity
Electricity
market
regulation
Industry
analysis

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Nepal, Rabindra ; Menezes, Flavio ; Jamasb, Tooraj. / Network regulation and regulatory institutional reform : Revisiting the case of Australia. In: Energy Policy. 2014 ; Vol. 73, No. October 2014. pp. 259-268.
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Network regulation and regulatory institutional reform : Revisiting the case of Australia. / Nepal, Rabindra; Menezes, Flavio; Jamasb, Tooraj.

In: Energy Policy, Vol. 73, No. October 2014, 10.2014, p. 259-268.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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