The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction

Sharon Ford

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We have an overwhelming sense of the world as containing spatially-oriented distinct objects, and it seems that we derive this sensation from the properties of things as revealed by their effects upon us. This paper asks what sorts of properties should be posited to exist in accounting for this ostensibly qualitative, yet powerful, world.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProperties, Powers and Structures
Subtitle of host publicationIssues in the Metaphysics of Realism
EditorsBrian Ellis, Howard Sankey, Alexander Bird
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherRoutledge Publisher (Taylor and Francis Group)
Chapter11
Pages181-199
Number of pages18
Edition1st
ISBN (Print)9780415895354
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameRoutledge Studies in Metaphysics
PublisherRoutledge
Number5

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Categorical

Cite this

Ford, S. (2012). The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. In B. Ellis, H. Sankey, & A. Bird (Eds.), Properties, Powers and Structures : Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism (1st ed., pp. 181-199). (Routledge Studies in Metaphysics; No. 5). New York: Routledge Publisher (Taylor and Francis Group). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203124482
Ford, Sharon. / The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. Properties, Powers and Structures : Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. editor / Brian Ellis ; Howard Sankey ; Alexander Bird. 1st . ed. New York : Routledge Publisher (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. pp. 181-199 (Routledge Studies in Metaphysics; 5).
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Ford, S 2012, The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. in B Ellis, H Sankey & A Bird (eds), Properties, Powers and Structures : Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. 1st edn, Routledge Studies in Metaphysics, no. 5, Routledge Publisher (Taylor and Francis Group), New York, pp. 181-199. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203124482

The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. / Ford, Sharon.

Properties, Powers and Structures : Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. ed. / Brian Ellis; Howard Sankey; Alexander Bird. 1st . ed. New York : Routledge Publisher (Taylor and Francis Group), 2012. p. 181-199 (Routledge Studies in Metaphysics; No. 5).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterResearchpeer-review

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Ford S. The Categorical-Dispositional Distinction. In Ellis B, Sankey H, Bird A, editors, Properties, Powers and Structures : Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism. 1st ed. New York: Routledge Publisher (Taylor and Francis Group). 2012. p. 181-199. (Routledge Studies in Metaphysics; 5). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203124482