Valuable Asymmetrical Friendships

T. Brian Mooney, John N. Williams

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Aristotle distinguishes friendships of pleasure or utility from more valuable 'character friendships' in which the friend cares for the other qua person for the other's own sake. Aristotle and some neo-Aristotelians require such friends to be fairly strictly symmetrical in their separateness of identity from each other, in the degree to which they identify with each other, and in the degree to which they are virtuous. We argue that there is a neglected form of valuable friendship - neither of pleasure nor utility - that allows significant asymmetries. We know of no sustained discussion of such 'asymmetrical' friendships in the literature.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)51-76
    Number of pages26
    JournalPhilosophy
    Volume92
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017

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    Mooney, T. B., & Williams, J. N. (2017). Valuable Asymmetrical Friendships. Philosophy, 92(1), 51-76. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000395